


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## SHAKING UP THE C.I.A.

Director Stansfield  
Turner Struggles to  
Rebuild America's  
Troubled Intelligence  
Community  
By Tad Szulc

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# SHAKING UP THE C.I.A.

By Tad Szulc

**J**immy Carter was furious. He sat in the Oval Office on this chill November day, staring at the note paper before him. Riots were sweeping Iran. The Shah had just been forced to impose a military government on his nation. And the President of the United States hadn't even known a revolution was coming — had, in fact, been assured all along by the American intelligence community that there was no such danger. Mr. Carter lifted his pen and wrote: "I am not satisfied with the quality of political intelligence." The notes were addressed to "Cy," "Stan" and "Zbig" — Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Those handwritten messages of last Nov. 11 were not the President's first expression of concern over the state of American intelligence, but they were by all odds his strongest. They removed any doubts of White House determination to force change upon the intelligence apparatus. It had failed him in a most astonishing manner.

A nation Jimmy Carter considered America's linchpin of stability in the Middle East, a nation in which the United States had essential strategic and economic stakes, was in the midst of a profound crisis. By February, Mr. Carter would see Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi's government replaced by a radical Islamic re-

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game with which the United States had established no contact. The loss of America's secret tracking stations that monitored Soviet missile testing would damage prospects for Congressional approval of the latest strategic arms limitations talks (SALT II.) The cutoff of Iranian oil production would spark shortages that plague American motorists to this day. Yet the President, until the end was almost at hand, had not known the depth or extent of the Shah's problems. That kind of failure over the last few years has led to the most comprehensive shake-up in the history of the nation's intelligence community. A major reorganization, begun early in 1978, continues. Special groups have been created to critique the community's efforts, including a new top-level unit, the Political Intelligence Working Group, that is forcing traditionally turf-conscious agencies to work together. Hundreds of Central Intelligence Agency operatives have been fired, sending the organization's morale — already low following the traumatic investigations of the mid-70's — plummeting to new depths. Congress is putting together legislation that would, for the first time, legally define the powers of, and limitations on, the intelligence community.

Only a few years ago, the C.I.A. and its partner agencies were being attacked as too aggressive and too powerful. Now, irony of ironies, some of the same liberals in Congress and the Administration who had led the charge have begun to worry over the failures in political intelligence. And they are calling upon the C.I.A. to assert itself, to take a greater role in policy formulation. The watchdog Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence is actually approving clandestine missions that would have been taboo as recently as 1976.

Meanwhile, the uproar over the nation's intelligence record has come full circle. The brickbats are no longer reserved for the "producers" of intelligence, such as the C.I.A. Critics charge that preconceptions and misconceptions on the part of the "consumers," the top policy makers, have prevented good decisions, regardless of the quality of the intelligence material presented them. The "consumers," of course, are primarily the National Security Council — and an angry letter-writer named Jimmy Carter.

## THE GATHERING STORM

"We will continue to anticipate tomorrow's crises as often as we can," says Adm. Stansfield Turner. "But our record here will never be as good as we would like it to be." Admiral Turner rules an empire with an estimated annual budget of \$15 billion and an army of tens of thousands, at home and abroad, overt and covert. But uneasy lies the head that wears that crown; the record of Admiral Turner's troops is not as good as his peers and masters would like it to be.

Since Harry Truman carved the C.I.A. out of the wartime Office of Special Services in 1947, the chief of that organization has also been responsible in theory for the larger intelligence community. Hence Admiral Turner's official title: Director of Central Intelligence/Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

But keeping rein on the dozen or so elements of the intelligence community can try a Director's soul. The C.I.A., the mainspring of the community, is a single, clearly defined entity. The other members of the community are a disparate lot, ranging from the Pentagon's National Reconnaissance Office, with its spy-in-the-sky satellites, to a Treasury Department unit that collects foreign financial data. Thus the Director of the community faces a built-in division of loyalty. The offices of the Department of Defense that collect foreign intelligence, for example, operate within a military hierarchy as well as within the intelligence community hierarchy.

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Over the years, that arrangement has helped make the Directorship one of the more notorious revolving-door jobs in Washington. Between 1973 and 1977, for example, four men — James R. Schlesinger, William E. Colby and George Bush — held the post. Probably the only Director who actually succeeded in exercising full control over the intelligence community as a whole was the imperious Allen W. Dulles, who was forced to resign seven months after the C.I.A.-sponsored Bay of Pigs disaster of 1961.

Admiral Turner was given a decisive leg up in the struggle. Eighteen months ago President Carter issued an executive order that, for the first time, gave the Director budgetary control over all elements of the intelligence community. Just how long Admiral Turner — a controversial figure in his own right — would be around to enjoy the benefits of that change, however, has been a matter of conjecture.

The Admiral is trim and earnest, a 55-year-old intellectual who was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University after graduation from Annapolis. He was sworn in as Director by Jimmy Carter in 1977; Senate opposition had led Mr. Carter to drop his first candidate for the job, former Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen.

Those who have worked with the Admiral say he's "tough" and "mean." Presumably they were necessary qualities for a man who commanded fleets for the United States and for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and who was in charge of Allied Forces Southern Europe. Presumably they came in handy on his C.I.A. assignment.

But the Admiral has drawn different kinds of comments of late, the kindest of them being "inept." The White House staff complained that he had failed to breathe new life into the C.I.A. There was a pronounced coolness toward him at the top of the Defense Department's intelligence establishment. Many of the Congressmen involved in C.I.A. oversight were dissatisfied. And he was not liked within the agency itself.

For close to a year, there has been insistent speculation that Admiral Turner was on his way out of the job. However, there is some doubt that the President would wish to give the revolving door another turn so soon.

Mr. Carter's executive order of Jan. 24, 1978, calling for reorganization, was not greeted with great enthusiasm throughout the intelligence community. It was, after all, the first public sign of the deep discontent the community's top consumers were feeling about product quality. Moreover, it arrived on the

heels of two of the worst years in the community's history.

Attacks on the C.I.A. and its sister agencies traditionally focus on interference with the rights of other nations, or with the rights of American citizens. And it was the illegal surveillance at home and abroad of American citizens suspected of antiwar activism that brought down on the C.I.A.'s head the Congressional investigations of 1975 and 1976. The agency's dirty linen was piled sky high: secret assassination plots against Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and Fidel Castro in Cuba . . . subversion of the Marxist regime in Chile . . . mind-control experiments with dangerous drugs . . . unlawful ties with American journalists and academics.

The necessity for the gathering of foreign intelligence was never seriously in question. For a President to make informed decisions about arms-limitation talks or oil imports, he requires some kind of intelligence-gathering and analysis apparatus. But the Congressional revelations led to demands that the intelligence community cease infringing upon individual liberties, and forsake its aggressive role in the making of foreign policy. Congress named a total of eight committees in both houses to oversee C.I.A. operations.

The intelligence community was shaken, but its problems were just beginning. Having been tried and convicted in the public eye on charges of being unethical, it was up on charges of being inefficient.

The issue was apparently first raised by National Security Adviser Brzezinski at a dinner given by Admiral Turner at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., on Oct. 27, 1977. Brzezinski complained to the senior officials present that the intelligence community had allowed its human-intelligence (known in the trade as "HUMINT") skills in gathering political data to decay because of the increased emphasis on technical intelligence — essentially the use of electronic and photographic devices. The data and information he was receiving at the White House, he said, fell far short of the mark in terms of policy-making requirements. (He noted along the way that he had stopped reading telegrams from most American ambassadors abroad because they provided no coherent assessment of political situations.)

Meanwhile, the staff of the National Security Council, the President's chief policy-making body for international affairs, was undertaking a full review of American security and intelligence, and that led ultimately to President Carter's executive order. Ten days before that order was issued, Brzezinski wrote forceful secret memorandums to

Admiral Turner and Secretary Vance expressing his unhappiness over the quality of American political intelligence. Among his complaints: a lack of basic source material and, as one of his associates put it, a lack of emphasis on "making sense."

There were other critics. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in a report issued last spring, took the community's "political-social analysis" record to task. In some instances, the committee found, "the performance of specialized public sources," such as trade publications, "equaled or exceeded that of the intelligence community." The community was said to emphasize current developments at the expense of analysis, and to have a limited ability to integrate political and economic factors in those analyses it produced.

Ray Cline, former C.I.A. Deputy Director for Intelligence, says that the agency's political intelligence skills "fell into disuse" in the late 1960's as a

result of high-level decisions to economize by cutting down on detailed reporting from the field — "in favor of summary analytical reporting." But, he insists, "if you don't have patient accumulation on political and economic events and trends, you're at a loss for relevant estimates when new data come in."

The critics have no dearth of specific instances of community failure:

- A still-classified Senate committee study claims that the C.I.A. led the Administration to believe that Cuba was actively behind the 1978 invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by exiles attacking from Angola, an assessment that has never been adequately documented. It led President Carter to publicly denounce the Cubans for mounting the invasion, to his subsequent extreme embarrassment.

- When the President announced in 1977 his plans to reduce the United States military presence in South Korea, he was not aware of the extent to which the North Koreans had been building up their armed forces since 1970. Army intelligence campaigned for a full review, but was ignored for nearly a year; only last spring did the community finally conclude that there were 550,000 to 600,000 troops arrayed in North Korea rather than the 450,000 it had previously reported. And nine days ago the White House officially announced the indefinite suspension of troop withdrawals, citing "security considerations."

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years the Director of Central Intelligence, was named Ambassador to Iran by President Nixon in 1973.

There was, however, some question about Savak's effectiveness. A senior American official well acquainted with its operations commented, "Savak wasn't all that good. . . . Though it did all right on Soviet clandestine operations inside Iran, it found itself penetrated by the Russians. . . . Savak also overreacted when it came to any political opponents. One time, in 1977, its agents badly beat up some innocuous kids in Teheran. So it was the sort of thing that just added to the pressures for the Shah's overthrow."

There was a third leg to the basic intelligence relationship in Iran — Mossad, the Israeli secret service. Mossad did not labor under the same kind of self-imposed limits as did the Americans. Moreover, they enjoyed the advantage of a major source of information in the influential Jewish community of 80,000 in Iran. Thus, Israeli Ambassador Uri Lubrani was able to correctly inform a visiting United States senator in 1976 that the greatest danger to the Shah came from the conservative Islamic clergy. And early in 1978, the Israeli Embassy in Washington sought to alert the State Department to danger signals in Iran. (It was repeatedly assured that all was well with the Shah.)

William H. Sullivan arrived in Teheran in June 1977 to replace Helms as American Ambassador. (Sullivan's background included a stint as Ambassador to Laos, during which he in effect ran the "secret war" of the C.I.A. and the Air Force against the North Vietnamese.) He quickly sized up the inadequacies in the collection of internal political intelligence. Even contacts with the middle-of-the-road opposition, the men who would soon form the National Front movement, were limited because many of the leaders were in exile and some of the others feared Savak reprisals if they talked to Americans. There were only three officers in the embassy who could speak the Persian language, Farsi; that was not enough to keep tabs on "the bazaars" — shorthand for the thousands of small shopowners who are the commercial and social heart of the big cities.

One source of information the C.I.A. ignored was in its own files, the National Intelligence Estimate of 1975. It identified the Islamic religious community, including Khomeini, as a basic cause of future unrest. It did not, of course, predict that a revolution would

break out in 1978, but the top-secret document did discuss in long-range terms the viability of the Iranian armed forces, the political attitudes of Iranian students at home and abroad, and the growing disaffection in the cities. Some agency officials say that the authors of the 1975 estimate had actually tried to "talk up" a better overt and covert collection effort in Iran, but had been ignored by their bosses.

On March 18, 1978, the Shah announced what would be the first of a series of concessions — the release of 385 prisoners. But day after day, through May and into June, the demon-

strations and riots continued, as did the flow of assurances from the Iranian Government that all was, in fact, under control. Ambassador Sullivan was telling Washington that things were "stirring," but not enough to prevent him from flying home for a summer vacation at the end of June. The British Ambassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, with whom Sullivan was in close contact, left on vacation at the same time.

Ambassador Sullivan returned to Teheran late in August. On Sept. 7, martial law was declared, and the following day, in Teheran, Government troops fired into protesting crowds; the opposition claimed that thousands of civilians were killed.

From Baghdad, the Ayatollah Khomeini called upon the Iranian armed forces to rise against the Shah. In Qum, the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari asked for "revenge from God against those who so bestially treated our children." And in Camp David, Jimmy Carter took time out from his meetings with Egypt's President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin to telephone the Shah and assure him of continued United States support.

What could have led President Carter to go out on such a limb? One factor was a report produced by the C.I.A. on Aug. 16, following three days of riots in Isfahan and presented to Mr. Carter personally by Admiral Turner in the course of a regular Wednesday White House briefing. This top-secret, 23-page document was far less exhaustive a product than the National Intelligence Estimate of three years before, and it took a different tack. Its conclusion: "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even prerevolutionary situation." The report stated that "those who are in opposition, both violent and nonviolent, do not have the capability to be more than troublesome."

The C.I.A.'s confidence in the Shah knew no bounds. In mid-September, as part of a routine rotation of personnel and as though no crisis existed, a new station chief, Horace Fleischman, was installed in Teheran. He had been serving in Tokyo.

There is general agreement today that the worst period of the "intelligence gap" ended in September. The C.I.A. station acquired a Farsi-speaking officer who could pick up the gossip in the bazaars. Ambassador Sullivan's reports home were taking on a more worried tone, as were those of the C.I.A. station. Strikes were erupting all over Iran — in the oil fields, the refineries, the banks.

Yet even as the intelligence gap was being closed by the "producers" in the field, another gap was yawning among the intelligence "consumers" back in Washington. Pessimistic views were being consistently rejected by the White House in general, and by National Security Adviser Brzezinski in particular. He remained convinced that the Shah should and would survive, and he was receiving assurances to this effect from Ardeshtir Zahedi, the Iranian Ambassador in Washington, whom he had selected as one of his principal sources of information. He had other outside sources as well, including some

Iranians who had been among his graduate students at Columbia University.

During November, Brzezinski apparently persuaded Zahedi to fly to Teheran to keep him advised of developments. Zahedi's communications were invariably optimistic, and they became the central influence on American policy decisions.

Brzezinski was the principal officer in charge of American policy in Iran. Secretary of State Vance spent most of his time on the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, and was for all practical purposes cut off from Iranian decision making. So were his top deputies.

Nor did Admiral Turner play a major policy role — his agency's stock at the White House was that low. A small but telling example of how that had happened was making the rounds of Washington: The C.I.A. had just discovered that Khomeini had written and published years before a book about his philosophy. The book was said to state precisely what he would do should he come to power. It was the kind of information an intelligence apparatus might have been expected to turn up automat-

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ically; in fact, it was not found until late in the game, and even then it was a private citizen who happened upon it and informed the agency.

Brzezinski was putting ever more trust in the Iranian armed forces to keep the lid on. But there were high-level doubters. In November, Lieut. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, visited Teheran. He came away with the impression that the army was trained and equipped to defend the country from external attack, but that it had not been taught how to deal with an internal threat.

Another November visitor to Teheran was then-Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal, who upon his return recommended that Mr. Carter get an independent evaluation of the mounting Iranian crisis. On Nov. 28, the President asked George W. Ball, a New York investment banker and Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, to prepare a special report. Two weeks later, as Iranian troops were killing at least 40 demonstrators in Isfahan, and Ambassador Sullivan was preparing the evacuation of dependents of American diplomatic and military personnel, George Ball submitted his report to the President, a document the Administration chose not to make public. Ball had come to Washington with his mind pretty much made up that the Shah was finished; his study of the situation had reinforced that view.

Ball presented his pessimistic report at a meeting in the Oval Office on Dec. 12, but later in the day, Mr. Carter told a news conference: "I fully expect the Shah to maintain power in Iran and for the present problems in Iran to be resolved. . . . I think the predictions of doom and disaster that came from some sources have certainly not been realized at all." White House officials said that the "doom and disaster" reference reflected Mr. Carter's unhappiness with the reporting by the em-

bassy in Teheran and the C.I.A. station there.

Another Presidential mission was in the works. According to White House sources, National Security Adviser Brzezinski had proposed that he himself secretly travel to Teheran to get the facts, hiding his presence there as Henry Kissinger had done in Peking in 1971. The President had agreed, but just before the scheduled Dec. 13 departure, Mr. Carter canceled the expedition, convinced that it simply could not remain secret.

Meanwhile, voices were being raised, particularly in the State Department, about the need for the United States to establish some form of contact with Khomeini, who had moved from Baghdad to a suburb of Paris, from where he was running the revolution. Men like Ambassador Sullivan thought that it would be impossible for the Administration to plan future policies without understanding the Ayatollah, and a sound judgment required a face-to-face meeting. In December, there were actually some secret meetings between a political officer at the American Embassy in Paris and Ibrahim Yazdi, an adviser to Khomeini. Yazdi told the American diplomat that the Ayatollah was interested in conferring with a senior United States official, and Ambassador Sullivan called Secretary Vance to recommend that the United States send an envoy to meet with Khomeini.

Vance agreed, and called Theodore L. Eliot Jr., who had retired three months earlier as Inspector General of the Foreign Service. But the mission was aborted. On Jan. 6, Vance received a telegram from Guadeloupe, site of a summit meeting of Western leaders. It was signed by Brzezinski, who was with the President at the meeting and was speaking in the President's name. The mission to Khomeini was canceled. Later, White House officials would explain that if word of Eliot's trip were to leak out, the mission might be construed as undermining the Shah.

By the first week of January, Iran was virtually paralyzed by strikes in every sector of the economy. The Shah named Shahpur Bakhtiar, a political moderate, as Prime Minister with a general understanding that he would be asked to organize a transitional government. Ambassador Sullivan was sure that it signaled the Shah's decision to leave Iran, at least temporarily.

Now American policy makers focused once again on the army. Would it stand by Bakhtiar in the immediate post-Shah period and prevent Khomeini from grabbing power? Ambassador Sullivan asked Washington to rush a senior United States military officer to Iran to establish liaison with the commanders. Air Force Gen. Robert E. Huyser, deputy commander of United States forces in Europe, was tapped for the job.

On Jan. 16, the Shah left Iran for Egypt, his first stop in exile. The military question was no longer academic, but General Huyser and Sullivan had a problem: They were receiving from Washington "tactical instructions" — how to deal with Bakhtiar on a day-to-day basis — when what they wanted

was policy guidance. For the two men had developed very different assessments of the situation. The Ambassador felt the armed forces had been "shellshocked" by the Shah's flight and thought they would split under a severe challenge. He worried that General Huyser was concentrating only on the top brass. The general, on the other hand, felt that the army had adjusted to the loss of the Shah and that morale was so high that they would hold fast if challenged by Khomeini. C.I.A. Station Chief Fleischman agreed with Sullivan.

The three men openly discussed their differences, and when Huyser was called to Washington early in February, he presented both sets of views. Brzezinski and his aides gratefully accepted General Huyser's estimates.

The Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Teheran in triumph on Feb. 1. In Washington, the Administration still expected the Iranian military to hold the fort for Bakhtiar. Even at this 11th hour, no alternative policies had been devised. On Feb. 11, following a pro-Khomeini demonstration at an air-force base outside Teheran, the army withdrew to its barracks. The end had come — an historic defeat for one of Washington's most important allies, for the entire American intelligence community and for the Carter Administration itself.

## PUTTING BACK THE PIECES

The office is quiet, spare: a wooden conference table, a large desk, no ashtrays, some big briefing charts with their transparent overlays. Adm. Stansfield Turner takes his private elevator to the top floor, the seventh, and moves toward his desk. It is February 1977, and he has just been confirmed in his new post. The C.I.A. is emerging from a public battering over its illegal misadventures in the United States and abroad. Morale is in need of a boost. But there is nothing to suggest to the Admiral that, before the year is out, he and the intelligence community will be under concerted bureaucratic attack and subjected to a sweeping reorganization.

Admiral Turner's tenure has seen a dramatic change in the relationship among the members of the intelligence community. The intelligence units of agencies outside the C.I.A., once pretty much autonomous, have been incorporated into a new chain of command

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under the Director. The Director has also been given the power of the purse over them. Thus, the Pentagon's National Security Agency, for example, which specializes in such arcane tasks as breaking Soviet codes, has become more responsive to overall intelligence community needs. Moreover, new committees have been created with extraordinary powers to poke into the nooks and crannies of the community and to cut across traditional tables of organization. Such moves, plus wholesale firings, plus continuing bureau-

cratic hassles, have exacerbated the morale problem. And there is concern within the community that the legislation now being drawn up in Congress to define the parameters of intelligence operations will cut further into C.I.A. prerogatives.

The central goal of virtually all of these changes is to improve efficiency, to prevent the kind of failure of intelligence gathering and analysis that took place in Iran. And the cutting edge of change has been bureaucratic — the reorganization of the community, from a relatively loose assemblage of elements into a tightly structured table of organization (see chart, Page 15).

At the top sit Director Turner and Deputy Director Frank C. Carlucci. Reporting to them are six deputies, each of whom supervises a number of specialized offices. And within each office, the personnel may be all C.I.A. or a mix of C.I.A. and other agency staffers. The theory is that the integration improves coordination among the elements, making use of the best skills of the entire community on any given assignment. Moreover, the six directorates make it more easily possible for those seeking to apportion blame to pin the tail on the right donkey.

How does the intelligence complex actually operate when confronted with a problem? The following scenario reflects the community's workings as of the summer of '79.

Assumption: The United States Government becomes aware of a sudden, unexplained movement of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.

In the National Security Council, it is the Special Coordination Committee that considers what is officially described as "sensitive foreign-intelligence collection operations." The National Security Adviser takes the chair; the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in attendance.

The Director of Central Intelligence is instructed to find the information necessary to understand the scope and intent of the Soviet troop movement. Upon his return to his Langley, Va., base, he calls in his Deputy for Collec-

tion Tasking, responsible for assigning intelligence units in other directorates to do the actual collection of data. (In the jargon of the community, "assigning" is translated as "tasking.") Within the directorate, the assignment job is farmed out among specialists — in PHOTINT (Photographic Intelligence) and HUMINT (Human Intelligence), for example — who will figure out what community resources to tap.

In addition to Collection Tasking, the Director and Deputy Director supervise three other operational directorates: National Intelligence, Science and Technology, Operations. All are to be involved in the Soviet troop-movement inquiry. The Director also has the authority to task member agencies of the intelligence community. For this inquiry, he calls upon the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Security Agency, both Pentagon-controlled operations.

At the supersecret National Photographic Interpretation Center, part of the Science and Technology directorate, specialists are instructed to search high-resolution photographs from satellites and U-2 spy planes for details of the troop movements. The National Reconnaissance Office, which spends the largest share of the intelligence community's budget, may be asked to send new satellites aloft. The National Security Agency orders a major new campaign of electronic eavesdropping on coded Soviet communications.

Meanwhile, the Deputy Director for Operations, the cloak-and-dagger chief, has alerted his network of agents around the world to be on the lookout for information bearing on the Soviet troop movements. More specifically, he has set his operatives in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself to ferreting out the reasons for the moves.

All the data stream in to the directorate for National Intelligence. Here the thousands of bits and pieces are shaken down and pored over; related

economic and political materials spew out of banks of computers. Experts in a dozen disciplines analyze the results, and finally a report emerges to make its way back up the chain of command through the Director's office to the National Security Council and, eventually, to the top consumer of the intelligence community's product, the President.



Along with the administrative changes has come a startling turnover in the top echelons over the past 18 months. Frank C. Carlucci, for example, has taken over as Deputy Director, second only to Admiral Turner in the community. A short, slim bureaucratic infighter, the 49-year-old Carlucci is a career Foreign Service officer who won high marks as ambassador in Lisbon during the Portuguese revolution of 1975, but he also served as director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and in other domestic posts under the Nixon Administration. President Carter named him to his current post in 1978. He has the respect of virtually all the power centers of Washington, legislative as well as bureaucratic, to a degree not enjoyed by Admiral Turner.

One of Carlucci's major responsibilities is his role on the Political Intelligence Working Group, created this year with no public notice to find ways of improving the product. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David D. Newsom and Deputy National Security Adviser David L. Aaron are the other members of the group, which has no chairman but operates with a small staff. It

conducts regular studies on what it calls "vulnerable countries," recommending priorities in political and sociological intelligence reporting in the field by embassies and C.I.A. stations.

The principal objective of the organization is to improve the coordination of overt and covert reporting by the State Department and the C.I.A.; they are now under orders to work together, pooling their

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assets, rather than pursuing the kind of separate operations typical of the past. In the course of its coordinating efforts, the group takes up such matters as "nominal" versus "integrated" covers for C.I.A. personnel in the embassies. A "nominal" cover is usually known to the host government; an "integrated" cover is deeply concealed.

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Another new community leader charged with increasing coordination among agencies is Lieut. Gen. Frank A. Camm, who runs Collection Tasking, a new C.I.A. post. A lanky, 6-foot 4-inch native of Kentucky, he holds graduate degrees from Harvard (engineering) and George Washington (international relations) and has helped to run the Corps of Engineers and the Atomic Energy Commission. He's been given the job of setting priorities within the community as to who will do what jobs and how the available resources in terms of people and money will be expended.

Under General Camm's wing, for example, is the newly created National Intelligence Tasking Office, staffed by representatives of the civilian and military agencies that make up the intelligence community along with the C.I.A. The center is intended to "coordinate" the intelligence units of these agencies, units that had been relatively autonomous before President Carter's Executive Order forced cooperation upon them.

The Energy Department, for example, is charged with overt collection of all information on energy matters abroad, and it cooperates with the C.I.A. in preparing against the day terrorists might try nuclear thefts. The Treasury Department collects foreign financial and monetary data. The Drug Enforcement Administration is supported by the C.I.A. (abroad) and the F.B.I. (at home) in rooting out

international networks of narcotics smugglers. The State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau specializes in analyzing information flowing from American embassies and consulates abroad. The Pentagon's Office of Net Assessments is concerned with the balance of strategic and conventional forces between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The net-assessments function is a bone of contention between the Pentagon and the C.I.A., the kind of issue that suggests why there's a need for coordination. The Defense Department insists that without access to the most classified aspects of the United States defense posture — access that the Defense Department denies to the C.I.A. — net assessment should not be made. Let the C.I.A. stick to its collection of information on the war-making potential of foreign nations, says the Pentagon, and leave the weighing of the balance of forces, historically a military-command function, to the military.

Admiral Turner protests that his agency "is not in the business of making net assessments nor does it intend to get into it." However, he does add that through the National Intelligence directorate the C.I.A. is "trying to find ways to make our assessments more meaningful [and] this inevitably involves some comparisons...."

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The single most criticized area of intelligence activity is now centralized in the directorate of National Intelligence, which is responsible for maintaining the flow of data and analysis, short- and long-term, to policy makers. This army of 1,500 analysts is commanded by Deputy Director Robert R. Bowie, a dapper, 69-year-old lawyer, educator and foreign-policy specialist whom Admiral Turner hired in 1977. He had once been chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, but this is his first job in the intelligence community.

Specific intelligence assessments are produced for Bowie by the corps of National Intelligence Officers. Years ago, the Office of Estimates drew on information and views from the entire intelligence community and reached conclusions by consensus (with dissents footnoted). Today, a National Intelligence Officer, a specialist in a given area, may seek cooperation from others in the community, but he drafts his own assessment.

It is the N.I.O.'s who produce the lengthy National Intelligence Estimates (N.I.E.'s), sometimes projecting a nation 10 years into the future; these papers, which include dissenting views in the actual text, must be approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board, made up of the chief intelligence officers of the community.

The trouble with such studies, as members of the community reluctantly admit, is that policy makers have no time to read them. Only the annual N.I.E. on the Soviet Union's strategic posture and intentions has a wide readership. As a rule, policy makers prefer daily current intelligence ("the quick fix," as a C.I.A. official calls it) although they complain about a lack of in-depth material after something — like Iran — has gone wrong. All of which poses what Bowie calls "tensions" between long-term and short-term intelligence requirements. He is constantly urged to provide current intelligence, making it increasingly hard to spring analysts loose for the N.I.E.'s and other in-depth studies.

Last fall Bowie established the post of National Intelligence Officer for Warning, and gave it to Richard Lehman, a C.I.A. veteran of 30 years. The Pentagon's Strategic Warning Staff, which had been primarily designed to provide advance notice of an impending nuclear conflict, was absorbed and its role expanded by Lehman. It now keeps the Government abreast

of major developments through "alert memoranda." It was Lehman's staff, for example, that warned the Administration that China would invade Vietnam last February and provided a correct assessment of how the situation would develop. Basically, the warning system is geared to situations with a potential for a Soviet-American confrontation. A coup d'état in, say, the Chad, does not trigger alert memorandums.

Yet another newly created unit is the super-secret "Moscow Committee," set up by the C.I.A. this year. It seeks to deal with Soviet efforts to destroy American intelligence networks abroad.

Meanwhile, Bowie has created a little-known but much-experienced group to oversee the whole collection and analysis effort. The Senior Review Panel is headed by the former Ambassador to Tanzania and Yugoslavia, William Leonhart. Its other members are retired Army Gen. Bruce Palmer, a former Vice Chief of Staff, and Princeton University Prof. Klaus Knorr, a scholar in the field of intelligence. The full-time panel serves as an in-house critic of the quality of intelligence; it is involved at the inception of every estimating process and in all of the post-mortems.

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The most demoralized of the departments under Admiral Turner's wing is the directorate for Operations, home of the cloak and dagger. John N. McMahon, a graying, 50-year-old veteran of almost three decades with the C.I.A., brings a

quiet demeanor to his post and is said to have considerable popularity with his subordinates — but he has had an uphill struggle coping with the body blows his organization has absorbed.

The Operations responsibilities are officially defined as the collection of "foreign intelligence, largely through secret

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means," counterintelligence missions abroad and "other secret foreign intelligence tasks." But for all the romantic and/or grisly tales of its operatives, covert spying today is devoted more to sophisticated espionage — recruiting foreign officials to serve as American spies, for example — than to the subversion, political action and guerrilla warfare of the past.

In part, that reflects the investigations of a few years ago; Congressional oversight committees are still sensitive about approving major covert operations, and the National Security Council's Special Coordination Committee (chaired by Brzezinski) is reluctant to propose "special activities." Moreover, this change has dramatically affected personnel. The agency's paramilitary capability,

for instance, has virtually vanished. Some 27 percent of the C.I.A.'s clandestine services staff is now 50 years of age or older; and replacements don't grow on trees. As Admiral Turner recently remarked, "You can't just recruit from the street for the spy shop."

Recruiting, of course, has not been a major activity within the community of late. During the last two years, the Admiral has fired more than 400 officers in the clandestine services. The C.I.A. had become "top-heavy," he says. The personnel cutback has damaged the agency's morale more than the Congressional investigations and all the other criticism put together.

All of which is not to suggest that spy satellites and electronic gadgets have totally taken over from flesh-and-blood spies. Covert operations continue, and in at least one important instance, they may be taking the place of scientific hardware.

The loss of the missile-tracking stations in Iran was a low blow to American surveillance of Soviet strategic testing, and it made some in Congress won-

der whether the SALT II treaty was even verifiable. Government experts claimed that because of complex satellite and radar surveillance networks around the world, the United States would not become blind altogether, even if it takes three or four years to replace fully the stations in Iran. What's more, though no one in Government will discuss the matter in detail, there are other sources of information concerning new missile designs, even before they have been test flown. The indications are that these sources are human agents who have in some fashion penetrated the Soviet defense establishment.

Thus the human element — HUMINT — can still have a major role in strategic intelligence; presumably it will continue to do so. "We have to play all the systems together," a senior C.I.A. official said the other day. "Spies tell you that there's something unusual on the ground, say, in the Soviet Union, so you order photography and signal intercepts, and then you have to go back to the spy. On the other hand, you don't want to send a spy to get what can be obtained from photographs. So it's a synergistic affair; the problem is how to get the synergism going."



The public concern over the ethics of the C.I.A. was reflected in the creation of the Intelligence Oversight Board, a private citizens' panel appointed by the President and operating from the Executive Office Building next to the White House. Its members are Thomas L. Farmer, a Washington lawyer, chairman; former Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee and former Gov. William S. Scranton of Pennsylvania.

The board reviews all activities of the intelligence agencies that might raise questions of propriety and legality. It has a mandate to report directly to the President any such flaws.

The major outside check on the community, however, is the Senate and House oversight committees. And it is in the Congress that the most significant limits ever imposed on the country's intelligence apparatus are now being designed, in the form of draft legislation. The so-called "charters," drawn up by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, will cover the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The goal: to define with reasonable precision the parameters for spying operations in all fields, including the setting of certain constraints on what the agencies are permitted to do. The central dilemma: how to reconcile national-security needs with the constitutional rights of Americans.

Reasonable men may differ on such an issue. The White House, for example, opposes as too cumbersome the committee's desire to require the President's personal approval of all major covert operations. The C.I.A. is holding out against Senators who would deny the agency the right to secretly use electronic surveillance on officials of foreign countries who hold American citizenship.

The committee staff hopes to have a draft completed by Labor Day, in an atmosphere viewed as remarkably favorable toward the intelligence community, given past history. "The environment has changed," says Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, committee chairman. He says that the proposed charter will not interfere with the agency's "ability to penetrate the decision-making process of foreign nations." But some members of the intelligence community, given the shaking up they've received of late, feel they're entitled to a few doubts.

## THE NEW AGE OF INTELLIGENCE

There has been no obvious change in the status of America's intelligence community. Each morning, the President of the United States still receives the top-secret document called the President's Daily Intelligence Brief. (Only five copies are produced.) Once a week, the President continues to welcome Admiral Turner or Deputy Director Carlucci to the Oval Office for a half-hour intelligence update. The very reorganization that Jimmy Carter has demanded of the intelligence community indicates his continuing interest — not to mention disappointment.

Yet the glory days of the C.I.A. seem to have passed. When the Cold War was perceived by the nation and its President as representing a clear and present danger, the intelligence community had a

special aura. There was little public discussion then of its "efficiency" (which in all likelihood was no greater than it is today) and Congress tended to look the other way when questions of means and ends arose.

There is no lack of major problem areas for the modern intelligence community to explore, from the growing turbulence in Latin America and the Caribbean to the strategic issues of SALT II and the economic threat posed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. And the C.I.A. is expected by its masters in the White House to come up with the data and analyses needed to deal with those issues. But it is apt to be a more careful, deliberate effort, relying more on electronic tools and patient collection than on the cloak and dagger.

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On the top levels of the intelligence community, there is some uncertainty about that prospect, and considerable resentment of the criticism the agencies have attracted. A Senator recently commented, for example, on the failure of today's C.I.A. to play a role on the policy-making level: "They must have some opin-

ions." To which a top C.I.A. official responds: "What is it that they want us to do? It's damned if we get involved in policy and damned if we don't. I guess, on balance, we prefer to stay out of it."

The complaints about the agency's efficiency, according to Admiral Turner, reflect some confusion as to the nature of intelligence work. Accurate political analysis, he says, "depends upon anticipating and correctly interpreting human action and reaction, some of which is inconsistent, or irrational, or driven by personal rather than national considerations. The best the analyst can do is to alert the decision maker to trends, possibilities, likelihoods."


As Admiral Turner sees it, the whole process of intelligence gathering and analysis is undergoing evolution from what he has called the old-fashioned "military-intelligence mentality" to a modern political, economic and sociological approach. "We are retooling," he says, "trying to understand the world." There is, however, pressure to speed up the process. The Congress and the President are impatient. ■

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# INSIDE INTELLIGENCE

## PRODUCERS

In an effort to improve the quality of its "product," the intelligence community — the C.I.A. and other agencies — has been reorganized. Four of the key new directorates are shown at left.



- ☐ Intelligence Community
- ☒ C.I.A.

## CONSUMERS

Those who use the "product" have been critical of it. In turn, the community charges the consumers with inefficiency.